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Abstract
We consider a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic
variables. All but one players have the same payoff functions, and one player (Player n)
does not. Two strategic variables are ti’s and si’s for each player i. Mainly we will show
the following results. 1) The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is equivalent to the
equilibrium when all but one players choose ti’s and Player n chooses sn as their strategic
variables. 2) The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is equivalent to the equilibrium
when all but one players choose si’s and Player n chooses tn as their strategic variables.
The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s and the equilibrium when all players choose
si’s are not equivalent although they are equivalent in a symmetric game in which all
players have the same payoff functions.
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1 Introduction
We consider a multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two strategic vari-
ables are ti and si for each player i. They are related by invertible functions. The game is
symmetric for all but one player in the sense that they have the same payoff functions. On
the other hand, one player (Player n) may have a different payoff function. Thus, the game is
partially asymmetric; or there is only one alien. In Section 3 we will show the following main
results.
1. The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when all
but one players choose ti’s and Player n chooses sn as their strategic variables.
2. The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when all
but one players choose si’s and Player n chooses tn as their strategic variables.
An example of multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables is a relative profit
maximization game in an oligopoly with differentiated goods. See Section 4. In that section
we will show;
1. The equilibriumwhen all players choose ti’s is not equivalent to the equilibriumwhen all
but one players choose ti’s and one player other than Player n chooses si as their strategic
variables.
2. The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
all but one players choose si’s and Player n chooses tn as their strategic variables.
3. The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
all but one players choose si’s and one player other than Player n chooses ti as their
strategic variables.
4. The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
all but one players choose ti’s and Player n chooses sn as their strategic variables.
5. The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
all players si’s.
In these results ti’s are the outputs and si’s are the prices. In a symmetric game they are all
equivalent1. In Section 4 we also show that with more than one aliens the equivalence result
does not hold.
In the next section we present a model of this paper and prove a preliminary result which is
a variation of Sion’s minimax theorem.
1Hattori, Satoh and Tanaka (2018).
2
2 The model and the minimax theorem
We consider a multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are n players,
n ≥ 3. Two strategic variables are ti’s and si’s, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote N = {1, . . . , n}.
The game is symmetric for Players 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 in the sense that they have the same payoff
functions. On the other hand, Player n may have a different payoff function.
ti is chosen from Ti and si is chosen from Si. Ti and Si are convex and compact sets in linear
topological spaces, respectively, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The relations of the strategic variables
are represented by
si = fi(t1, . . . , tn), i ∈ N,
and
ti = gi(s1, . . . , sn), i ∈ N .
fi(t1, . . . , tn) and gi(s1, . . . , sn) are continuous, invertible, one-to-one and onto functions. We
assume that all Ti’s are identical, and all Si’s are identical. Denote them by T and S.
When only Player n chooses sn, then tn is determined according to
tn = gn( f1(t1, . . . , tn), . . . , fn−1(t1, . . . , tn), sn).
We denote this tn by tn(t1, . . . , tn−1, sn).
When all players choose si’s, i ∈ N , then ti’s for them are determined according to


t1 = g1(s1, . . . , sn),
. . .
tn = gn(s1, . . . , sn).
Denote these ti’s by ti(s1, . . . , sn).
The payoff function of Player i is ui, i ∈ N . It is written as
ui(t1, . . . , tn).
We assume
ui : T1 × · · · × Tn ⇒ R for each i ∈ N is continuous on T1 × · · · × Tn. Thus, it is
continuous on S1× · · · × Sn through fi, i ∈ N . It is quasi-concave on Ti and Si for a
strategy of each other player, and quasi-convex on Tj, j , i and S j, j , i for each
ti and si.
We do not postulate differentiability of the payoff functions.
Symmetry of the game for Players 1, 2, . . . , n−1means that these players are interchangeable
in the payoff function of each player. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values
of the payoff functions of the players is zero.
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
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Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological
spaces, and let f : X × Y → R be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first
variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable, then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
f (x, y) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
f (x, y).
We follow the description of Sion’s theorem in Kindler (2005).
Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper such that Player n may choose sn and the
other players choose ti’s as their strategic variables, we have the following relations.
max
ti∈T
min
tn∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk) = min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk).
max
ti∈T
min
sn∈S
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) = min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk),
where tk is a vector of tk, k , i, n, of the players other than Players i and n who choose tk’s as
their strategic variables. ui(ti, tn, tk) is the payoff of Player i when Players i and n choose ti and
tn. On the other hand, ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) means the payoff of Player i when he chooses ti and
Player n chooses sn.
We show the following results.
Lemma 2.
min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk) = min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk)
= max
ti∈T
min
sn∈S
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) = max
ti∈T
min
tn∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk),
Proof. maxti∈T ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given sn. Let
t¯i(sn) = argmaxti∈T ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk), and fix the value of tn at
t0n = gn( fi(t¯i(sn), t
0
n, tk), fk, sn), (1)
where fk denotes a vector of the values of sk’s of players who choose tk’s. We have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, t
0
n, tk) ≥ ui(t¯i(sn), t
0
n, tk) = max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk),
where maxti∈T ui(ti, t
0
n, tk) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given the value of tn at t
0
n .
We assume that t¯i(sn) = argmaxti∈T ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) is single-valued. By the maximum
theorem and continuity of ui, t¯i(sn) is continuous, then any value of t
0
n can be realized by
appropriately choosing sn according to (1). Therefore,
min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk) ≥ min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk). (2)
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On the other hand, maxti∈T ui(ti, tn, tk) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given tn. Let
t¯i(tn) = argmaxti∈T ui(ti, tn, tk), and fix the value of sn at
s0n = fn(t¯i(tn), tn, tk). (3)
We have
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, s
0
n, tk), tk) ≥ ui(t¯i(sn), tn(ti, s
0
n, tk), tk) = max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk),
where maxti∈T ui(ti, tn(ti, s
0
n, tk), tk) is the maximum of ui with respect to ti given the value of
sn at s
0
n. We assume that t¯i(tn) = argmaxti∈T ui(ti, tn, tk) is single-valued. By the maximum
theorem and continuity of ui, t¯i(tn) is continuous, then any value of s
0
n can be realized by
appropriately choosing tn according to (3). Therefore,
min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) ≥ min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk). (4)
Combining (2) and (4), we get
min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) = min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk).
Since any value of sn can be realized by appropriately choosing tn, we have
min
sn∈S
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) = min
tn∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk).
Thus,
max
ti∈T
min
sn∈S
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) = max
ti∈T
min
tn∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk).
Therefore,
min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk) = min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk),
=max
ti∈T
min
sn∈S
ui(ti, tn(ti, sn, tk), tk) = max
ti∈T
min
tn∈T
ui(ti, tn, tk).

3 The main results
In this section we present the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. The equilibriumwhere all players choose ti’s is equivalent to the equilibriumwhen
one player (Player n) chooses sn and all other players choose ti’s as their strategic variables.
Proof. 1. Consider a situation (t1, . . . , tn−1, tn) = (t, . . . , t, tn). By symmetry for Players 1,
2, . . . , n − 1
max
ti∈T
ui(t, . . . , ti, . . . , t, tn) = max
tj∈T
u j(t, . . . , t j, . . . , t, tn), for any i, j , n,
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and
argmax
ti∈T
ui(t, . . . , ti, . . . , t, tn) = argmax
tj∈T
u j(t, . . . , t j, . . . , t, tn) ∈ T, for any i, j , n,
given tn.
Let
tn(t) = argmax
tn∈T
un(t, . . . , t, tn).
We assume that it is a single-valued continuous function.
Consider the following function.
t → argmax
ti∈T
ui(t, . . . , ti, . . . , t, tn), for any i , n, given tn.
This function is continuous and T is compact. Thus, there exists a fixed point given tn.
Denote it by t∗(tn), then
t∗(tn) = argmax
ti∈T
ui(t
∗(tn), . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗(tn), tn), for any i , n, given tn.
Now we consider the following function.
t → t∗(tn(t)).
This also has a fixed point. Denote it by t∗ and tn(t
∗) by t∗n, then we have
t∗ = argmax
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, t∗n), for any i , n,
t∗n = argmax
tn∈T
un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn),
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, t∗n) = ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n), for any i , n,
and
max
tn∈T
un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n).
(t1, . . . , tn−1, tn) = (t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n) is a Nash equilibrium when all players choose ti’s as
their strategic variables.
2. Because the game is zero-sum,
u1(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) + · · · + un−1(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) + un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = 0.
By symmetry for Players 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
(n − 1)ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) + un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = 0.
This means
(n − 1)ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = −un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn),
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and
(n − 1)min
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = −max
tn∈T
un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn).
From this we get
argmin
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = argmax
tn∈T
un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = t
∗
n, for any i , n.
We have
min
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n) = max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, t∗n), for any i , n.
Thus,
min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn) ≤ max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, t∗n) = min
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn)
≤ max
ti∈T
min
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn), for any i , n.
From Lemma 2 we obtain
min
tn∈T
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn) = max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, t∗n) (5)
= min
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = max
ti∈T
min
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn)
= min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, sn))
= max
ti∈T
min
sn∈S
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, sn)), for any i , n.
3. Let
s0n(t
∗) = fn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n).
Since any value of sn can be realized by appropriately choosing tn,
min
sn∈S
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)) = min
tn∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n). (6)
Thus,
argmin
sn∈S
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)) = s
0
n(t
∗).
(5) and (6) mean
min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, sn)) (7)
= min
sn∈S
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)).
We have
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, sn)) ≥ ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)).
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Thus,
argmin
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, sn))
= argmin
sn∈S
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)) = s
0
n(t
∗).
By (7)
min
sn∈S
max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, sn))
= max
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, s0n(t
∗)))
=min
sn∈S
ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)) = ui(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, s0n(t
∗))).
Therefore,
argmax
ti∈T
ui(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, tn(t
∗
, . . . , ti, . . . , t
∗
, s0n(t
∗)) = t∗. (8)
This holds for any player i , n.
On the other hand, because any value of sn is realized by appropriately choosing tn,
max
sn∈S
un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)) = max
tn∈T
un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn) = un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n).
Therefore,
argmax
sn∈S
un(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, sn)) = s
0
n(t
∗) = fC(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, t∗n). (9)
From (8) and (9), (t∗, . . . , t∗, tn(t
∗
, . . . , t∗, s0n(t
∗))) is a Nash equilibrium which is equiva-
lent to (t∗, . . . , t∗, t∗n).

Interchanging ti and si for each player, we can show
Theorem 2. The equilibrium where all players choose si’s is equivalent to the equilibrium
when one player (Player n) chooses tn and all other players choose si’s as their strategic
variables.
4 Various examples
Consider a game of relative profit maximization under oligopoly including four firms with
differentiated goods2. It is a four-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. The
firms are A, B, C and D. The strategic variables are the outputs and the prices of their goods.
We consider the following four patterns of competition.
2About relative profit maximization in an oligopoly see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013),
Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a), Tanaka
(2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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1. Pattern 1: All firms determine their outputs. It is a Cournot case.
The inverse demand functions are
pA = a − xA − bxB − bxC − bxD,
pB = a − xB − bxA − bxC − bxD,
pC = a − xC − bxA − bxB − bxD,
and
pD = a − xD − bxA − bxB − bxC,
where 0 < b < 1. pA, pB, pC and pD are the prices of the goods of Firms A, B, C and
D, and xA, xB, xC and xD are their outputs.
2. Pattern 2: Firms A, B and C determine their outputs, and Firm D determines the price
of its good.
From the inverse demand functions,
pA = (1 − b)a + b
2xC − bxC + b
2xB − bxB + b
2xA − xA + bpD,
pB = (1 − b)a + b
2xC − bxC + b
2xB − xB + b
2xA − bxA + bpD,
pC = (1 − b)a + b
2xC − xC + b
2xB − bxB + b
2xA − bxA + bpD,
xD = a − bxC − bxB − bxA − pD
are derived.
3. Pattern 3: Firms A, B and C determine the prices, and Firm D determines the output.
From the inverse demand functions,
xA =
(1 − b)a + b2xD − bxD + bpC + bpB − bpA − pA
(1 − b)(2b + 1)
,
xB =
(1 − b)a + b2xD − bxD + bpC − bpB − pB + bpA
(1 − b)(2b + 1)
,
xC =
(1 − b)a + b2xD − bxD − bpC − pC + bpB + bpA
(1 − b)(2b + 1)
,
pD =
(1 − b)a + 3b2xD − 2bxD − xD + bpC + bpB + bpA
2b + 1
.
4. Pattern 4: All firms determine the prices. It is a Bertrand case.
From the inverse demand functions, the direct demand functions are derived as follows;
xA =
(1 − b)a + bpD + bpC + bpB − 2bpA − pA
(1 − b)(3b + 1)
,
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xB =
(1 − b)a + bpD + bpC − 2bpB − pB + bpA
(1 − b)(3b + 1)
,
xC =
(1 − b)a + bpD − 2bpC − pC + bpB + bpA
(1 − b)(3b + 1)
,
xD =
(1 − b)a − 2bpD − pD + bpC + bpB + bpA
(1 − b)(3b + 1)
.
The absolute profits of the firms are
piA = pAxA − cAxA,
piB = pBxB − cB xB,
piC = pC xC − cC xC,
and
piD = pDxD − cD xD .
cA, cB, cC and cD are the constant marginal costs of Firms A, B, C and D. The relative profits
of the firms are
ϕA = piA −
piB + piC + piD
3
,
ϕB = piB −
piA + piC + piD
3
,
ϕC = piC −
piA + piB + piD
3
,
and
ϕD = piD −
piA + piB + piC
3
.
The firms determine the values of their strategic variables to maximize the relative profits.
We see
ϕA + ϕB + ϕC + ϕD = 0,
so the game is zero-sum. We assume cA = cB = cC , that is, the game is symmetric for Firms
A, B and C. However, cD is not equal to cA. Thus, the game is partially asymmetric. Firm D
is an alien.
We calculate the equilibrium outputs of the firms in the above four patterns.
1. Pattern 1
xA =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
xB =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
xC =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
and
xD =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
.
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2. Pattern 2
xA =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
xB =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
xC =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
and
xD =
bcD − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
.
3. Pattern 3
xA =
3b2cD + bcD + 4b
2cA − 5bcA − 3cA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab + 3a
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
,
xB =
3b2cD + bcD + 4b
2cA − 5bcA − 3cA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab + 3a
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
,
xC =
3b2cD + bcD + 4b
2cA − 5bcA − 3cA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab + 3a
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
,
xD =
3a − 2b2cD − 7bcD − 3cD + 9b
2cA + 3bcA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
.
4. Pattern 4
xA =
3b2cD + bcD + 4b
2cA − 5bcA − 3cA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab + 3a
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
,
xB =
3b2cD + bcD + 4b
2cA − 5bcA − 3cA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab + 3a
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
,
xC =
3b2cD + bcD + 4b
2cA − 5bcA − 3cA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab + 3a
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
,
xD =
3a − 2b2cD − 7bcD − 3cD + 9b
2cA + 3bcA − 7ab
2
+ 4ab
2(1 − b)(b + 1)(7b + 3)
.
We find that Pattern 1 is equivalent to Pattern 2 (an example of Theorem 1), but it is not
equivalent to Patterns 3 and 4, and that Pattern 4 is equivalent to Pattern 3 (an example of
Theorem 2), but it is not equivalent to Patterns 1 and 2.
Next let us examine a case where cB = cA and cC = cD but cA , cD. Consider the following
two patterns of competition.
1. Pattern 1: All firms determine their outputs. It is a Cournot case.
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2. Pattern 2: Firms A and B determine their outputs, and Firms C and D determine the
prices of their goods, then
pA =
b2xB − bxB + 2b
2xA − bxA − xA + bpD + bpC − ab + a
b + 1
,
pB =
2b2xB − bxB − xB + b
2xA − bxA + bpD + bpC − ab + a
b + 1
,
xC =
b2xB − bxB + b
2xA − bxA + bpD − pC − ab + a
(1 − b)(b + 1)
,
xD =
b2xB − bxB + b
2xA − bxA − pD + bpC − ab + a
(1 − b)(b + 1)
.
We calculate the equilibrium outputs of the firms in these two patterns.
1. Pattern 1
xA =
2bcD − bcA − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
xB =
2bcD − bcA − 3cA − ab + 3a
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
xC =
3a − bcD − 3cD + 2bcA − ab
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
,
xD =
3a − bcD − 3cD + 2bcA − ab
2(3 − b)(b + 1)
.
2. Pattern 2
xA =
2bcD + bcA − 3cA − 3ab + 3a
6(1 − b)(b + 1)
,
xB =
2bcD + bcA − 3cA − 3ab + 3a
6(1 − b)(b + 1)
,
xC =
bcD − 3cD + 2bcA − 3ab + 3a
6(1 − b)(b + 1)
,
xD =
bcD − 3cD + 2bcA − 3ab + 3a
6(1 − b)(b + 1)
.
Patterns 1 and 2 are not equivalent. Therefore, with more than one aliens the equivalence
result does not hold.
12
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have examined equilibria in a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum
game. We have shown that in an asymmetric zero-sum game with only one alien (a player
who has a different payoff function) we get the equivalence result about the choice of strategic
variables.
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